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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, multinational activity has exploded. Multinationals have not only expanded the number of their subsidiaries, but increasingly more rms are also choosing to become multinational and are investing abroad. Concurrently, intellectual property rights (IPR) have become an important issue both for countries that are home to investing multinationals and for countries that are potential hosts for new af liates.
Countries in the Middle East are no exception as foreign direct investment (FDI) has poured into the region over the last few years and as recent trade negotiations with the US and EU have focused on the enforcement of IPR. Recently, Middle Eastern countries like Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and central Asian countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan have found themselves on the US special 301 watch list as countries with inadequate intellectual property protection.
Anecdotal evidence both from the press and private businessmen illustrate how FDI from multinationals and IPR can be closely related. Multinationals with plants in countries with weak intellectual property rights often complain of domestic rms illegally pirating proprietary designs and technologies and using these same technologies to compete directly. In the Middle East some countries have cracked down on copyright abuse at the request of foreign multinationals. To the extent that FDI renders multinationals more susceptible to technology stealing than exporting, weak IPR can be a deterrent to FDI.
Weak IPR may not only deter FDI but also have differential impacts on different types of multinationals. The literature on rm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004) has already shown how individual rm characteristics affect a variety of rm decisions in international trade. Unfortunately, the existing theoretical and empirical literature on IPR and FDI assume rm homogeneity and cannot predict nor describe how individual rm characteristics affect a rm's decision to outsource to weak IPR environments. This paper attempts to ll this gap.
1 This paper develops a simple model to show how weak IPR can create a sorting across heterogenous rms where the least advanced rms build plants in weak IPR regions (the south) and more advanced rms stay in the strong IPR region (the north).
2 By assuming that locating in the south makes a rm's technology susceptible to imitation, a rm's willingness to move to the south decreases as its technology increases. Technology in the model makes rms more 1 See Helpman (1993) , Lai (1998) , Glass and Saggi (2002) , Glass (2004), and Fosfuri (2004) for theoretical discussions assuming rm homogeneity. Lee and Mans eld (1996) , Javorcik (2004) , Yang and Masksus (2001) , and Smith (2001) empirically measure whether countries with stronger FDI receive more FDI, again assuming rm homogeneity. Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) and Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2005) exploit changes in IPR policy but again mostly rely on the rm homogeneity assumption. 2 This designation is unfortunate but standard in the trade literature.
productive. Imitation, therefore, by making competitors more productive, reduces pro ts for the rm, and rms with more technology who are copied make competitors even more productive.
Although imitation also imposes an added cost to moving to the south and although this cost increases with a rm's technology, this intuition is not what drives the model. Assume that there are two rms considering moving to the south, one with more technology than the other. The technology of southern rms may be such that the imitation cost for the rm with less technology is suf ciently small so that this rm will locate to the south. However, once southern rms have imitated this new technology, the technology gap between southern rms and the remaining northern rm may now be suf ciently small such that the northern rm will locate to the south. Thus, with this intuition an unravelling can occur where all northern rms locate to the south. The sorting result where rms with more technology locate in the north in the model is achieved through the fact that imitation makes southern rms more competitive and not through the fact that rms with more technology suffer higher imitation costs.
If one assumes that the process of stealing and imitating technology is costly and increasing in the level of the technology, there can exist a set of northern rms that are immune to imitation. The model then predicts a non-monotonic result where the least advanced rms outsource to the south, the moderately advanced rms stay in the north, and the most advanced who are immune to imitation again outsource to the south.
Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis's (BEA) 1999 Benchmark Survey on Direct Foreign Investment Abroad, this paper also empirically tests the general implications of the rm heterogeneity model. An extensive margin analysis tests whether rms with more technology, measured as research and development expenditures (R&D) as a percentage of sales, are less likely to have af liates in weak IPR environments. An intensive margin analysis tests whether rms with more technology have a smaller presence, measured in relative af liate sales and employment, in weak IPR environments. Empirical results are consistent with the non-monotonicity result. Both the least and most technologically advanced multinationals invest in the south and rms in the middle only invest in the north.
By considering rm heterogeneity, the results have implications on government policies that speci cally target multinationals. Many governments create tailored policies (i.e., tax incentives or structural improvements) to attract foreign multinationals to their borders. Even in the United States, different states compete with one another to attract multinational plants as in the recent cases of Honda and Toyota. By predicting which multinationals are most likely to move to weak intellectual property rights environments, the paper suggests that developing countries with weak IPR need not bother targeting low technology or extremely advanced rms, since they have natural incentives to locate there. Instead, weak IPR countries should spend resources targeting rms with moderate technology, as these rms are exactly those that would not have located there otherwise.
Section II introduces the model. Section III describes the data in detail. Section IV describes the empirical results and nds evidence of this non-monotonic relationship in a sample of US multinationals. Robustness checks in section V suggest that IPR is important in deriving these results, although identi cation questions may still exist. Section VI concludes.
II. MODEL A. Setup
The world is assumed to be divided into two countries, the north where IPR are protected and the south where they are not. Consumers are identical in all countries and abide by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
where x 0 is a homogenous good and X j is an aggregate consumption index in industry j and P J j=0 j = 1. The aggregate index is de ned as a function of the individual varieties:
where x i is consumption of the individual good and n j is the number of varieties in the sector.
Each variety is produced by a separate rm, and rms have monopoly power over the variety they produce. Northern rms are heterogenous over technological advancement, k, where higher levels of k correspond to higher advancement, and advancement is distributed over a distribution (k) with support [k; 1). Southern rms are homogenous and all have the lowest level of technological advancement, k.
A higher level of technological advancement allows a rm to produce its good at lower marginal cost. Labor is the only factor of production, and each worker can produce k units of the nal good. Labor is assumed to be immobile. Although technological advancement in this model is very similar to a general productivity term, it is important to note that k captures only that element of productivity that is imitable and protected in the north but not in the south. IPR should not affect more general concepts of productivity like rm organization or rm culture which can be imitated anywhere regardless of IPR laws.
Wages in the north are xed at w > 1 and normalized to one in the south. This assumption of xed wages can be derived from a general equilibrium framework by assuming that w is the productivity of workers in the north relative to workers in the south at producing one unit of the homogenous good and that the labor supply is large enough such that the homogenous good is produced in both countries.
Iceberg type transport costs are assumed between the north and the south where nal delivery of one unit of the good requires > 1 initial units. Southern rms produce goods in the south. Northern rms can choose whether to establish one plant either in the north or the south.
3 As will be clear later, to prevent all rms from moving to the south, > w is also assumed. The total expenditure of northern consumers in the industry, Y N , and of southern consumers, Y S , are taken to be exogenous.
If a northern rm establishes a plant (outsources) in the south, its technology is instantly and always imitated. Outsourcing to the south is assumed to render technology more vulnerable to imitation than simply exporting. This may occur because outsourcing rms presumably hire native workers who can transfer technology elsewhere or because industrial espionage can more easily occur in rms with a physical presence in the south. Khan (2003) makes a similar assumption and motivates it by assuming that existing technology in the north cannot be used in the south without paying an adaptation cost. However, once one rm pays the adaptation cost, all southern rms can free ride and adapt at no extra cost.
Imitation implies that all southern rms instantly produce at the technological advancement of the outsourcing northern rm. If multiple northern rms outsource, productivity of all southern rms is at the level of the most productive outsourcing northern rm. Following Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006) who nd that northern drug companies violate each others' patent rights in India, outsourcing northern rms are assumed to also imitate and produce at the productivity of the most productive outsourcing northern rm. In accordance with TRIPS agreements, imitated technology can only be used for sale in the south, and goods in the north must be produced with non-imitated technologies.
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B. Firm Decision
A northern rm will establish manufacturing plants in the south if pro ts from locating in the south exceed pro ts from locating in the north. The equilibrium will be found when all rms make an optimal location decision given the decisions of all other rms.
We rst examine the decision of the rm whose entire set of less advanced competitors has located to the south and then show that, given this rm's decision, the entire set of less advanced competitors would, indeed, prefer to be in the south. Proposition 1 in this section will also show cannot have a plant in both markets. A three country model can be written where northern rms have a home market and an away northern and southern market. In this model, northern rms will have a plant in the home northern country and a plant either in the away northern country or the south. Theoretical predictions are identical with this alternative model. This alternative model is given in Appendix D. 4 This model of imitation is different from many existing theories. Existing theories assume perfect substitution between the original and imitated good. (See Lai, 1998; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi, 2005) This model allows for imperfect substitution. Imperfect substitution may be important as Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991) nd that in the US pharmaceutical industry prices only fall by around 0.8% for the entry of each generic substitute. For an example from a developing country, Chaudhauri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006) nd empirical evidence of imperfect substitutability in the Indian drug industry.
that this equilibrium is unique.
From pro t maximization in this imperfect competition framework, by locating in the north a northern rm with technological advancement k whose entire set of less advanced competitors has moved to the south will earn pro ts of = N + S where
(1)
Y N and Y S are the total expenditures in the industry of the northern consumers and southern consumers, respectively. N N and N S are the number of northern and southern rms respectively, and = 1 . All these parameters are taken to be exogenous.
Locating to the south gives pro ts of 0 = 0N + 0S to the same northern rm where:
The northern rm will move to the south if 0 . This will be true as long as k k where k is de ned implicitly by the following equation:
The left hand side of equation 3 is an unbounded function of k (where k = k) while the right hand side is a constant.
For expositional convenience, I de ne the following assumptions as assumption 1.
Assumption 1 .
(1) > w > 1. 5 The parameters P N and P S do not change depending on the location choice since, in this type of model, each rm on the distribution of k is atomistic.
(3) k is suf ciently small.
(4) G(a) is bounded.
Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 holds, k > k exists and is unique.
The proof is given in Appendix C.
The inequality > w guarantees that not all northern rms will locate in the south. The assumption that B >
guarantees that the relative size of the southern market is not too small. Because of transport costs, locating to the south increases pro ts from the south but reduces pro ts from the north. If the market size of the south is too small, northern rms will never have incentive to sacri ce sales from the north for increased sales to the south.
Requiring k to be suf ciently small ensures that the southern market is not already so competitive such that no northern rm wants to go to the south. Finally, G(a) being bounded is a technical assumption to ensure that P N and P S exist.
Proposition 2 All northern rms with technological advancement less than that of the most advanced outsourcing northern rm, k, will locate to the south.
By locating to the south any individual rm with technology less than k will not change the technology of southern rms. However, by locating to the south this same northern rm will experience a technology gain by copying northern rms with better technology. This extra technology gain ensures that rms with technology below k prefer to locate in the south.
Northern rms weigh the effects of cheaper labor, transportation costs, and technology imitation in deciding to outsource. Northern rms that are only a little more advanced than the most advanced outsourcing rms always choose to outsource since the cost of technology imitation is small. In this way the equilibrium can unravel. Once one northern rm outsources and southern rms learn new technology, the next most advanced northern rm outsources which triggers the next most advanced rm to outsource, and so on. In this way, either all northern rms outsource or none do.
This unravelling is avoided in this model by assuming transport costs. Because of transport costs, rms have an extra cost advantage in selling to the market in which they produce. For example, a northern rm which locates its manufacturing facilities in the north saves on transport costs when selling products in the north. If the northern rm switches its production facilities to the south, it pays transport costs when selling products in the north but saves on transport costs when selling goods to the south.
Firms will locate to the south if the gains to the south exceed the costs to the north. The gains of moving to the south decline as the technology of southern rms increase. The technology of southern rms increase as northern rms with more and more technology locate in the south. Thus, a threshold exists where rms with less technology than the threshold locate to the south, and rms with more do not. Very advanced rms do not outsource because by outsourcing and letting southern rms imitate their technology, the gains of moving to the south become too small.
It is important to note that as more advanced rms move to the south, the gains to relocating decline for all northern rms since all competing southern rms suddenly become more competitive. Imitation creates an externality. One northern rm's decision to relocate affects the decision of all other rms by changing the technology of competitors. In fact, in equilibrium all northern rms who stay in the north are actually indifferent between staying in the north or relocating if they could effectively prevent imitation. However, these northern rms stay in the north because they know that, if they move to the south and are imitated, southern rms will become so advanced that outsourcing will be unpro table for all northern rms including their own.
Mathematically, the rm moves to the south if
If equation 4 holds when all northern rms are located in the north, some northern rms will move to the south. As northern rms move to the south and southern rms imitate technology, P S will increase. Eventually, P S will increase so much that equation 4 will hold with equality. At this point, all northern rms are indifferent between locating in the north or the south. However, because by moving to the south, an advanced northern rm will increase P S and reverse the inequality in equation 4, rms with technology above k will prefer not to locate in the south. Figure 1 gives a visual depiction of k.
C. Cost to Imitating
This subsection introduces a very simple model of imitation cost. Including imitation cost can generate non-monotonicity in terms of technology advancement and the decision to move to the south. Each rm that seeks to imitate a technology must pay a marginal cost c(k) where k is the level of technology being imitated. The marginal cost c(k) is presumably much smaller than the original research cost, but no imitating rm can free ride off the imitation efforts of another. Intuitively, stealing a technology requires managers to learn technology or to hire workers who can understand the new technology. This cost must be paid by all imitators (Teece 1977) .
Assume that the marginal cost of imitating new technology is c(k) = k C where C is a constant, and k is the level of technology being imitated.
The marginal bene t of stealing a technology is:
As long as the cost of imitating increases faster in k than the gains to imitating, some northern rms will be immune to imitation. For this to be the case, any cost function c(k) that is more convex than @ S @k will suf ce.
Because the marginal cost is more convex than the marginal bene t, there will exist a threshold k such that the marginal cost to imitating will exceed the marginal bene t. No technology beyond k will be imitated, and northern rms with technology higher than k will be immune to imitation. In this framework, the level of k is increasing in C, and k can be de ned implicitly in C i.e. k (C). Again, for expositional convenience, I de ne the following as assumption 2.
Assumption 2 .
(1) > w > 1.
(3) C is suf ciently high.
Proposition 3 If Assumption 2 holds, then all northern rms with technology less than k locate in the south, northern rms with technology (k; k ) locate in the north, and northern rms with technology greater than or equal to k locate in the south.
Thus, with a simple model of imitation cost, it is possible to generate a non-monotonic result where northern rms with technology less than or equal to k locate in the south, rms with technology (k; k ) locate in the north, and rms with very high technology greater than or equal k locate in the south. Figure 2 gives a visual depiction of both k and k .
III. DATA DESCRIPTION
Data for this paper comes primarily from the BEA's con dential annual survey on US direct investment abroad. By legal requirement US multinational rms report selected nancial data separately for their own US operations and operations of each foreign af liate subject to reporting requirements depending on size.
This dataset only includes American rms with multinationals abroad. Parent rms with operations only in the United States are not required to report. Thus, with this dataset, one can only test the theory conditional on a rm already having decided to conduct FDI. Although the theory does not make this distinction, in practice, this distinction may actually be important. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) show that only certain types of rms undergo FDI. Thus, a dataset which includes rms not doing any FDI could confound the effects that are being estimated with the rm's decision to do FDI, at all.
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This paper uses the 1999 "benchmark" survey. 8 Benchmark surveys are given every ve years and include more extensive nancial information. The 1999 benchmark survey was chosen because it was the most recent one available at the time of writing and because all foreign af liates were required to report regardless of size.
9 In addition, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) document that the pattern of US FDI shifted in the 1990s. During that decade, US FDI greatly expanded outside of the OECD where it was concentrated before. Because countries with weak IPR tend to be outside the OECD, data from the late 1990s is particularly relevant.
Only US parent rms whose main line of business are in manufacturing, computer services, telecommunications, and research and design services are included in the dataset. In addition, parent rms whose main line of business constitute less than 70% of total sales are dropped.
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Only majority-owned af liates who have the same main line of business as their parents are 7 In addition, the model can be written as a three country model with two northern countries and a southern country. Northern rms have a home market, an away northern market, and a southern market. Northern rms service the home market with a home plant and must decide whether to service the foreign markets with a plant in the other northern country or the south. All results follow as in the two country model. Firms with the least and most technology place their foreign plant in the south, and rms with moderate technology place their foreign plant in the north. This model is given in Appendix D. With the model written in this way, this dataset which only includes rms with foreign af liates is naturally suited to test the predictions of the theory. 8 Data from the 1994 benchmark survey was used as a robustness test. Results are not as strong from this dataset although it is noted that the volume of foreign direct investment increased tremendously between 1994 and 1999, especially to weak IPR countries.considered.
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Countries are classi ed as having weak IPR or strong IPR according to Zhao (2004) . A list of countries and their classi cation are given in Appendices A and B. Zhao (2004) investigated the extent to which multinationals conduct research in weak IPR countries. Because her application is similar to the one here, her classi cation seems to be a natural one to use. In addition, by combining the analyses of six different IPR indices, Zhao (2004) captures a more accurate picture of IPR environments and is able to classify a greater sample of important countries including China and several Eastern European countries. Most other indices omit these countries from their analyses and also overemphasize one aspect of IPR over all others such as legal statutes over practical enforcement in the case of Ginarte and Park (1997) , the most often cited IPR index. Finally, Zhao (2004) requires that a country have some type of imitative and innovative potential in the form of human capital capacity.
13 This is particularly appealing as even in weak IPR environments the act of imitation is not automatic and requires intellectual ability.
Zhao (2004) fails to classify several countries primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. Since it is not clear whether these countries should be considered as having weak or strong IPR, these are not considered in the analysis. Less than 7% of US af liates operate in these omitted countries. Any parent who reports having an af liate in these omitted countries is dropped from the analysis. This results in 96 parents being dropped from the nal sample.
14 With these criteria the dataset includes 2,674 foreign af liates in 50 different countries belonging to 830 US parent rms. The measure of technological advancement of the rm chosen is parent R&D expenses as a percentage of parent rm sales. These R&D expenses only include expenses incurred at the parent rm and do not include R&D at any of the parent's subsidiaries. This choice is particularly important since the theory predicts that only that component of technological advancement that can be imitated and is protected in the north but not protected in the south matters.
dataset is advantageous in the sense that the extent of the missing data is known. 16 With this collection of parents and af liates, the dataset is then collapsed such that each parent only appears once. If the parent has an af liate in at least one weak IPR country, the variable entitled weak will be assigned one. Parents with no af liates in a weak IPR country have variable weak = 0. With this framework country level explanatory variables cannot be included.
An alternative empirical framework that has been used elsewhere in the literature is to expand the dataset so that each parent appears multiple times. If there are 50 countries in the world, each parent will appear 50 times, and the parent's choice of investing in each country is analyzed. This speci cation allows for country level explanatory variables to be included. However, this speci cation also requires that a parent's choice of investing in one country be independent of its choice in investing in any another country. Clustering standard errors may partially alleviate the independence concern but may still not be suf cient as the decision to invest in one country could directly in uence the decision to invest in another. Because of these dif culties, this speci cation is not pursued. Although taxes are a country level variable, tax rates are important at the rm level as through transfer pricing they may confound parent R&D expenses, the main explanatory variable of interest. Parents who have af liates in countries with low tax rates may funnel some of their sales through the af liate to take advantage of lower taxes. Analogously, af liates in countries with high tax rates may funnel their sales through the parent to avoid higher taxes. Since the measure of technological advancement, R&D expenses as a percentage of sales, includes parent level sales, transfer pricing will affect the main independent variable of interest. To correct for this, regressions include a sales weighted average tax rate over countries in which the parent has af liates. When R&D expenses as a percentage of sales appears as a square, this mean tax rate variable will also appear as a square. Country tax rates are taken as the top corporate tax rate from the University of Michigan World Tax Database.
Another problem related to transfer pricing is that parent rms may intentionally establish af liates in countries with low tax rates just to take advantage of tax incentives. If weak IPR countries tend to have low tax rates, parents may establish af liates in weak IPR countries for reasons not related to IPR. To control for this, regressions will include a minimum tax variable which is de ned as the minimum tax rate in all strong IPR countries the parent operates in. This variable is capped at 35% which is the tax rate of the US Parents with af liates only in weak IPR countries also have this variable assigned as 35%.
Finally, because parents with af liates in weak IPR countries tend to have more af liates overall, regressions include a rm's total number of af liates to control for this observable difference.
It may seem obvious that parents with many af liates are more likely to have af liates in weak IPR countries. A nding that R&D has explanatory power even with the inclusion of number of af liates implies that R&D is important even beyond this obvious fact. Finally, industry dummies at the North American Industry Classi cation System (NAICS) four digit level are included in all regressions.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Extensive Margin
The main empirical speci cation is a probit regression with weak as the dependent variable and R&D as a percentage of sales as the main independent variable of interest. Tax variables are included to control for transfer pricing effects, and the total number of af liates is also included. The rst column of Table 1 tests the linear speci cation to see if increases in technological advancement decrease the likelihood of a parent rm investing in a weak IPR country.
17 Because different rms in the same industry may experience common shocks, all standard errors are clustered at an industry level that is classi ed by the BEA. 18 Although the sign on technological advancement is as predicted, it is hardly signi cant. Column 2 eliminates those parents whose measure of technological advancement are in the largest 1% of the sample. Their exclusion does not change the results.
Column 3 of Table 1 tests whether the relationship is non-monotonic. It appears that, at low levels of technological advancement, increases in R&D as a percentage of sales decrease the likelihood of investing in a weak IPR country, while, at high levels of technological advancement, further increases in R&D spending increase the likelihood of investing in weak IPR countries. These relationships are highly signi cant and robust to the exclusion of outliers (column 4). Turning point in Table 1 gives the level of R&D as a percentage of sales such that increases in R&D no longer reduce but increase the probability of investing in a weak IPR country. CI gives the con dence interval associated with the turning point calculated by the delta method, and percentage gives the percentage of rms with R&D below this point.
Although these results are consistent with the theory, there are concerns with identi cation. Identi cation problems can be separated into two categories. On one hand, R&D expenses as a percentage of sales may be proxying for other rm characteristics that are important in determining location choice like capital intensity or general productivity levels. On the other hand, the classi cation of weak and strong IPR countries may be closely correlated with a classi cation based on country economic development or country market size. Therefore, the results outlined above do not describe the relationship between technological advancement and IPR but between technological advancement and another factor like economic development. The rst of these issues is considered in the rest of this section. The second of these issues is explored in the Robustness section.
If R&D expenses as a percentage of sales is proxying for other rm characteristics, an easy way to address this problem is to include these rm characteristics in the regression directly. One possibility is that technologically advanced rms are also capital intensive, and that this capital intensity is what is driving the results.
To address this concern, column 5 of Table 1 includes the capital intensity of the parent rm directly. Capital intensity is de ned as the log of the value of property, plant, and equipment at the parent subtracted by the log of its total number of employees. The non-monotonic relationship of R&D as a percentage of sales remains, and the coef cient on capital intensity is insigni cant.
The argument about capital intensity can be extended to human capital. Technologically advanced rms may more heavily rely on skilled labor. To proxy for the extent of skilled labor at the parent rm, column 6 of Table 1 includes the log of the average employee wage at the parent rm. The employee wage is de ned as the total amount of employee compensation divided by the total number of employees. Again the non-monotonic relationship of R&D as a percentage of sales remains, and the coef cient on the log of wages is insigni cant.
Most studies of heterogeneous rms on af liate location choice focus on general productivity as the main determinant of location choice (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; and Yeaple, 2005) . R&D expenses may be a proxy for general levels of productivity. To control for this, the log of sales in the main line of business 19 is included in the speci cation. The coef cient on this variable is positive and signi cant. However, the non-monotonic relationship of technological advancement survives. This suggests that productivity may have an effect on where a multinational decides to outsource. However, technological advancement or that element of productivity that is able to be imitated and protected in the north but not in the south still has a separate and important effect as described in the preceding model.
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B. Intensive Margin
A second empirical speci cation attempts to take advantage of the intensive margin of rms. The dependent variable of the previous speci cation was binary and measured the extensive margin of a rm's decision to locate. The following speci cation considers the extent of a rm's presence in weak IPR countries measured as af liate sales or employment in weak IPR environments.
Af liate sales and employment in weak IPR countries are measured relative to total af liate sales and employment around the world. The dependent variable of column 10 in Table 1 is the total sum of af liate sales in weak IPR countries for a given parent divided by total af liate sales around the world. The non-monotonic relationship appears and signi cantly so.
21 Note that controls for parent level capital intensity, skilled labor, and the general level of productivity are included.
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A concern with using af liate sales may be that many parents export to the af liate a large percentage of the af liate's sales. Thus, af liate sales may not be a good proxy for the amount of value added done by the af liate. To address this concern, column 11 in Table 1 uses af liate employment as the dependent variable. Results are similar.
Finally, the theory suggests that the relationship between technological advancement and af liate location choice should be more pertinent in industries where technology is particularly important. The theory may not hold as well for industries like textiles or food and beverage manufacturing. Table 2 repeats the analysis in Table 1 but separates the sample into industries that are more technologically sensitive and industries that are not. Technologically sensitive industries are de ned to be machinery manufacturing, computers and electronic products, electrical equipment, transportation equipment, and medical equipment and supplies.
23 Although the square of R&D is signi cant across both types of industry groups, the negative linear R&D term is signi cant only for the technologically sensitive industries. 24 In the theory, the predicted negative linear term on R&D comes from the northern rm's fear of imitation and the positive prediction on the squared term comes from rms that are immune to southern imitation. The results of this analysis suggest that the fear of imitation is more prevalent in the technologically sensitive industries, although very advanced rms in both types of industry are willing to invest in the south.
21 Because tax mean is a sales weighted average of the tax rate, there could be concerns that a mechanical relationship exists between the tax mean variable and the dependent variable. When the average tax rate is weighted by employment, all results are still the same. 22 Af liate sales in levels is not analyzed as idiosyncratic rm effects could highly in uence sales. Some rms simply have af liates with high levels of sales across the board. Relative sales, which normalizes for these effects, is a better measure of af liate activity (See Brainard, 1997) . 23 These industries appear most often in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database. They exclude the chemicals and pharmaceutical industries because imitation in these industries can occur anywhere and not just in places where rms have af liates. 24 For regressions separated between technologically sensitive and non-sensitive industries, standard errors are not estimated with clustering across general industry categories. Standard errors are simply corrected with White's correction for heteroskedasticity. For asymptotic properties, clustering requires a large number of cluster groups. This analysis divides the sample so that each regression contains very few cluster groups. When doing the analysis with clustering, the estimated non-monotonicity is generally stronger for the technology group, although the distinction is not as sharp. All results in Table 1 are robust to not including clustered standard errors.
C. Within Industry
Although the results of the extensive margin and the intensive margin with relative sales and employment are consistent with the theory, it is important to note that the theory predicts a non-monotonic relationship within industries. Pooling all the industries together even with industry xed effects does not fully test the theory since different industries may have different turning points.
To address this concern, the speci cations on the extensive margin and the intensive margin are run with R&D as a percentage of sales interacted with a general industry dummy for each general industry.
25 General industry dummies are interacted with the square of R&D as a percentage of sales in the same way. The log of wages, capital intensity, the log of sales in the main line of business, and NAICS 4 digit industry dummies are included as explanatory variables although their coef cients are not reported. 26 The results are given in Table 3 .
Across the twelve general industry groups with a large enough sample size such that coef cients and standard errors can be estimated, eight general industry groups have negative R&D linear terms and positive squared terms as the theory suggests across both the extensive and intensive margin speci cations. Of the four general industries that do not have the predicted signs, only furniture manufacturing has the inconsistent signs across all three estimations.
Because the coef cients on the interactions are estimated within general industry groups, the fact that many of these general industry groups have small sample sizes makes inference dif cult. Regardless, the estimated non-monotonic relationship is signi cant at the 10% level a total of thirteen times in these three regressions. The relationship is especially apparent for food and beverage manufacturing and electronic components manufacturing. Only in two of these thirteen cases does the signi cant relationship not follow the predicted theory, once for furniture manufacturing and once for transportation equipment.
Although it is puzzling why the theory seems to fail in the extensive margin case for transportation equipment, it should be noted that this reverse relationship is not found in the intensive margin analysis. Regardless, in other industries where one would expect the theory to most apply like 25 General industries are industry classi cations that are more aggregated than at the NAICS four digit level. They are classi ed by the BEA, and the dataset includes 15 general industries. They are food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing; textiles, apparel, and leather products; wood products and paper; printing and related support activities; petroleum and coal products; chemicals, plastics and rubber products, and non-metallic mineral products; primary and fabricated metals; machinery; computers and electronic products; electrical equipment, appliances, and components; transportation equipment; furniture and related products; miscellaneous manufacturing; telecommunications and information services and data processing; and professional, scienti c, and technical services. 26 Clustering techniques are not used since the coef cients on the interactions are estimated only within cluster groups. Clustering with general industry groups makes the results even sharper. machinery, computers, and electronic components, the data seems to be supportive.
Because small sample sizes in each of the general industries makes interpretation dif cult, it is important not to overanalyze these results. This analysis is useful in that it clearly indicates that the relationship estimated in the pooled regressions also exists at the general industry level.
V. ROBUSTNESS A. Identi cation
The second identi cation problem is that the classi cation of countries as having weak or strong IPR may be highly correlated with other country characteristics that may be affecting af liate choice. It is de nitely true that countries with strong IPR tend to be more developed, to be larger, and to have more educated workforces. However, if the weak IPR classi cation is proxying for other country characteristics like economic development, an objection to the identi cation in the main regression requires an alternative story that explains the non-monotonicity.
A determinant of af liate location choice often cited in the literature is market size. To differentiate between the effects of IPR and market size, this analysis takes the sample of the main analysis and reclassi es the countries according to market size. About 1/3 of the countries in the original sample are classi ed as being large and the rest of the countries in the original sample are classi ed as being small. 27 The ratio 1/3 for large countries is chosen because 1/3 of the countries in the sample are considered to have strong IPR. The correlation between having a large market size and strong IPR is quite strong. The dependent variable small will be one if the parent has an af liate in a country with small market size. Table 4 indicates that despite the strong similarity, when the countries are reclassi ed by market size, the results of the main section do not appear.
A second determinant of af liate location choice often cited is economic development. Again, the original sample of countries is reclassi ed according to whether the country belongs in the OECD in 1999. The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey are the 9 weak IPR countries in the OECD. Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan are strong IPR countries not in the OECD. Unfortunately, very few rms have af liates in these strong IPR non OECD countries. Because of the even stronger level of similarity between both categories, with this new classi cation 75% of parents remain identically the same.
The dependent variable, N OECD will be one if the parent owns an af liate operating in a country that is not part of the OECD in 1999. In Table 5 the results of the extensive margin analysis are much weaker with this new classi cation. The results of the main section seem to reappear in the intensive margin analysis.
The correlation between weak IPR and being economically developed is quite strong, so it is not 27 GDP data is 1999 GDP in current US dollars taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).
entirely surprising that an attempt to parse between these factors is not entirely clean. However, a classi cation based on economic development certainly does not work better and may even be worse as results do not appear in the extensive margin.
The same exercise is considered with country education levels to examine the effect of human capital. 28 Table 6 shows that under this classi cation (leduc) the non-monotonic results go away in both the intensive and extensive analysis. This exercise is repeated again for distance from the United States. Transport costs are often cited as a major factor in FDI decisions.
29 Table 7 (dependent variable f ar) indicates that this classi cation does not deliver the same results as the main section.
Finally, Yeaple's (2005) empirical analysis of af liate location choice uses the social infrastructure variable from Hall and Jones (1999) . This social infrastructure variable considers the government's role in protecting against diversion and the country's openness to free trade. Trade barriers are again an oft cited determinant of FDI choice. Repeating the exercise for the set of countries whose social infrastructure is worse than 2/3 of the original sample gives the results in Table 8 . The results of the extensive margin fall away. For the intensive margin, the IPR results are not replicated as the coef cient on the linear term of R&D is not signi cant.
Although market size, economic development, human capital, physical distance, and social infrastructure were all analyzed as possible alternatives to the IPR story, it is important to note that many of these alternative stories would not necessarily give the prediction that parents at low levels of technological development would be less likely to invest and then at higher levels of technology be more likely to invest independent of rm characteristics like capital intensity, wages, and general productivity.
Regardless, when the original sample is parsed into different categorizations, the non-monotonic results of the main section consistently seem to weaken. Even a reclassi cation by economic development only returns the results for the intensive margin. Therefore, it does not appear that any one of these alternatives is primarily driving the results of the main section. One objection, however, is that parent rms make location choices with all these factors in mind. Although each factor taken individually may not be able to replicate the results of the main section, a thorough investigation would consider all these factors simultaneously. This simultaneous analysis is impossible under the current framework.
B. Alternative Estimation
A large drawback associated with the empirical analysis, thus far, is that it does not allow for the inclusion of country level explanatory variables. Currently, the dataset is constructed so that each rm appears only once and the dependent variable is one if the rm has an af liate in a weak IPR 28 The data on education levels is the "tyr" variable in the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset.
29 Data on country distance from the US was gratefully taken from Andrew Rose's website.
country. The dataset could be expanded so that each rm appears once for every country in the dataset. The dependent variable will be one if the rm has an af liate in that country.
With this expanded dataset, a logit or probit regression could be run. The main drawback with this type of analysis is that this implictly assumes that a rm's decision to invest in one country is independent of its decision to invest in another. This assumption is most likely counterfactual. Clustering standard errors may not be suf cient as the decision to invest in one country could directly affect the decision to invest in another in a manner that is beyond a simple correlation in error terms.
It may be slightly better to run a rm level conditional logit. This would nd estimates after conditioning on the total number of countries in which the rm has af liates. Unfortunately, even after conditioning on the number of countries the rm has af liates in, this analysis still assumes that the decision to invest in one country does not directly in uence its decision to invest in another.
This subsection proposes a slight variant of this conditional logit regression which allows an investment decision in one country to in uence the decision to invest in another country. This method allows the inclusion of country level characteristics and utilizes each parent's entire location decision. 30 To describe the estimation technique, take as an example a rm that has af liates in three countries called A, B, and C. This analysis assumes that the rm can order the three countries according to a preference. One might suppose that it prefers locating in country A the most, country B the second most, and country C the least. If this is the case, a likelihood function can be written.
If the rm most prefers establishing an af liate in country A, using a Heckman selection model, the probability of this occurring is:
where the subscript i indexes countries. Recall that in the Heckman selection model, the explanatory variables X vary across choices (countries in this case).
If the rm perceives establishing an af liate in country B as second most desirable, then conditional on having preferred A over B the probability that B is preferred over all remaining possibilities is:
where Z i is a subset of the country characteristics X i . The term Z 0 B A is included to re ect the fact that after a rm has preferred country A and established an af liate there, the characteristics 30 I thank Eric Sun for suggesting this approach. of country B may have different effects. For example, assume that low tax rates in a country increase the probability of a rm creating an af liate there. If country A already has low tax rates, the value of tax rates may not be as important to the rm when it chooses its second most preferred country. Thus, Z i are country characteristics that may have effects on the decision to locate a subsidiary but whose effects may change after an af liate has already been established in another country.
Similarly, the probability of the rm perceiving country C as the third most desirable is: P r(3rd choice = C j 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A) (8)
.
The logic is similar as above.
Finally, the fact that the rm only chose to have af liates in these three countries implies that the rm preferred to have no af liates than having af liates in any other country. This probability is given by: P r(4th choice = no choice j (9) 3rd choice = C; 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A)
The variable X 0 are the explanatory variables associated with choosing to have no other af liates. The values of these explanatory variables are all set to zero. The variable X i also includes an indicator variable that is one when i = 0. This is the only non zero entry in X 0 . It is important to note that the decision to not have any more af liates is considered a separate choice. At every stage, the rm can decide to not establish any more af liates. Therefore, X 0 is included in the summation in each of the denominators above.
Thus, if a rm has af liates in all three countries and if it prefers country A to country B to country C, the likelihood of this occurring is :
P r(4th choice = no choice; 3rd choice = C; (10) 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A) = P r(4th choice = no choicej 3rd choice = C; 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A) P r(3rd choice = Cj 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A) P r(2nd choice = Bj 1st choice = A) P r(1st choice = A)
Since one does not actually know the rms' preferences, the probability of observing the rm having af liates in country A, B, and C is: P r(4th choice = no choice; 3rd choice = C; 2nd choice = B; 1st choice = A) (11) +P r(4th choice = no choice; 3rd choice = C; 2nd choice = A; 1st choice = B) +P r(4th choice = no choice; 3rd choice = B; 2nd choice = C; 1st choice = A) +P r(4th choice = no choice; 3rd choice = B; 2nd choice = A; 1st choice = C) + : : :
This methodology can be generalized to any number of countries in which a rm has af liates, although the number of terms in equation 18 is equal to n! where n is the number of countries in which the rm has af liates. Given this likelihood function, maximum likelihood estimation can be done.
The results of this estimation technique are given in Table 9 . The main results seem robust to this alternative estimation. The main variables of interest are R&D intensity and R&D intensity squared both interacted with the weak IPR dummy. The interaction is necessary because, just as in the conditional logit framework, this technique does not allow for the inclusion of rm (individual) speci c characteristics, only country (choice) speci c characteristics. The coef cients on these interaction variables should describe how R&D intensity affects the probability of establishing an af liate only in weak IPR countries. Firm speci c characteristics like capital intensity, the log of wages, and the log of sales are included in the same way. The log of GDP per capita, log of population, log of distance, tax rates, educational attainment and social infrastructure are included as country level explanatory variables. These variables are also included in Z i where Z i are the country level variables that may affect the probability of investing depending on where else the rm has already invested.
Finally, because the terms in equation 18 increase according to the factorial of the choices, computational limitations prevent the use of the full sample. In the results presented, only rms that invest in four or fewer countries are included. In addition, in order to estimate the 's given above, only countries in which more than six rms invest are included. Unfortunately, this drops 31% of the sample. This is regrettable but unavoidable given computational challenges.
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Firm heterogeneity has proved to be empirically important in many contexts. It appears that rm heterogeneity may also be contributing to FDI decisions in weak IPR environments. Although identi cation issues are still a legitimate concern, empirical results seem to indicate that a non-monotonicity exists such that rms at low levels of technology outsource to the south, rms with moderate amounts of technology locate in the north, and rms with very high technology 31 The coef cients estimated with this analysis should be interpreted with caution. The likelihood function is very at at the maximum, and, so, estimates from the optimization program may be imprecise. The results of this section should be interpreted as a check against the main regressions.
again outsource to the south.
If one takes these results seriously, both developing and developed countries should reconsider policies targeting multinationals. If low technology and high technology rms are likely to locate in weak IPR environments, governments in such countries should expend resources targeting multinationals with moderate technology. Analogously, developed countries that worry about the extent of outsourcing should focus their attentions on policies that target the most advanced multinationals since these are most at risk for locating abroad.
In terms of technology transfer, the results of this paper suggest that lowering the cost of imitation by only enforcing weak IPR laws could have ambiguous effects on technology transfer to the south. On one hand, weak IPR laws render it easier for domestic rms to learn the technology of multinationals invested in the host country. However, if weak IPR laws select less advanced multinationals to invest, overall technology transfer could be lower under a weak IPR regime. Whether weak IPR fosters or hinders overall technology transfer will depend on the sensitivity of IPR laws on multinational investment and the sensitivity of IPR laws on domestic technology learning. The precise magnitudes of these sensitivities could be considered for future research. 
This is always positive since > 1, w > 1, and > w. Thus, the left hand side of equation 3 is monotonically increasing in k.
Since the left hand side of equation 3 is monotonically increasing in k and the right hand side is a constant, existence and uniqueness of k only requires that at k = k, the left hand side is less than the right hand side of equation 3. This is guaranteed by assuming B >
and k is suf ciently small.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The northern rm with technological advancement k < k will move to the south if pro ts from moving to the south are larger than pro ts from locating in the north, that is, if:
This condition can be rewritten:
Rewriting equation 3 gives:
The left hand side of equation 14 is the same as the left hand side of equation 15. Since k < k, we know that equation 14 must hold.
Proof of Proposition 3:
For the sake of the proof, I rst assume that all rms with technology greater than k locate in the south and then check that this is true later.
By locating in the north, a northern rm with technological advancement k whose entire set of less advanced competitors has moved to the south will earn pro ts of = N + S where
Pro ts from locating in the south are:
Repeating the analysis from before gives a new threshold k below which all rms will locate in the south. All rms with technology (k; k ) will locate in the north. k is de ned implicitly by:
Again, the left hand side of equation 12 is an unbounded function of k (where k = k), and the right hand side is a constant.
The existence and uniqueness of k follow from Assumption 2 and is proved exactly as before. Assumption 2 again guarantees that the left hand side of equation 12 is less than the right hand side at k and that the right hand side is monotonically increasing in k. The proof that all northern rms with technology less than k go to the south is exactly as in Proposition 2.
The assumption that all northern rms with technology greater than k locate in the south holds at equilibrium. At equilibrium, rms with technology greater than k are technically indifferent between locating in the north and the south. Recall that at equilibrium equation 4 holds as an equality so that a northern rm who will not change P S by moving to the south is indifferent between locating in the north or the south. Since rms with technology higher than k cannot be imitated, they do not change P S by locating in the south. They are indifferent between locating in the north and the south and can be assumed to go to the south.
This indifference breaks down, and very productive rms prefer moving to the south, the moment imitation is anything less than instantaneous. If imitation takes two periods to occur fully, very productive rms will enjoy rents from locating to the south for the one transition period (since P S will not be at its long run high level) and be indifferent between locating in the north or south thereafter.
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A complication exists if k < k. However, as long as C is suf ciently large, this will never be the case.
APPENDIX D: THREE COUNTRY MODEL
This appendix presents the model where the world consists of three countries, two northern countries named the east and the west, and one southern country. For the sake of convenience , the two northern countries are assumed to be symmetric.
The northern rm now owns a plant in its home market (i.e. a western rm has a plant in the western market). Demand for its good in the home market is entirely serviced by the home plant. The western rm decides whether to build a plant in the east or the south to service the entire foreign market. It must be assumed that the rm cannot build a plant both in the east and the south.
Northern rms with technology beyond k are immune to imitation by the framework given before. Because conditions in the east and the west are symmetric, rm decision is the same for an eastern or western rm. Thus, a prototypical northern rm by locating its foreign plant in the north earns pro t of = H + N + S where
Pro ts from locating in the south are
Again, northern rms will locate in the south if 0 . This will be true as long as k is less than k where k is de ned implicitly by:
With assumption 3, the proof that all rms with technology less than k locate in the south and that all rms with technology greater than k locate in the south are the same as in Proposition 3.
Assumption 3 .
(4) G(a) is bounded. 
(8) .12 -.20
.12 -.21
. Only parents with NAICS industries 3111 to 3399 or 5133 to 5142 or 5413 to 5419 are included. Turning Point is the level of R&D% such that increases in R&D% have a positive effect.
CI is the confidence interval associated with the turning point.
Percentage gives the percentage of firms with R&D% less than the turning point.
No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
+ indicates significance at the 10% level, * at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value. Standard errors are corrected with White's correction for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level.
Only parents with NAICS industries 3111 to 3399 or 5133 to 5142 or 5413 to 5419 are included.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value.
Turning Point is the level of R&D% such that increases in R&D% have a positive effect. CI is the confidence interval associated with the turning point. Percentage gives the percentage of firms with R&D% less than the turning point. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level. Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value. Turning Point is the level of R&D% such that increases in R&D% have a positive effect. CI is the confidence interval associated with the turning point. Percentage gives the percentage of firms with R&D% less than the turning point. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level.
For technology and non-tech subsamples, standard errors are only corrected with White's correction for heteroskedasticity.
Only parents with NAICS industries 3111 to 3399 or 5133 to 5142 or 5413 to 5419 are included. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level. Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level. Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value. CI is the confidence interval associated with the turning point. Percentage gives the percentage of firms with R&D% less than the turning point. No Out excludes firms whose R&D% is in the highest 1% of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at a general industry level.
Only parents with NAICS industries 3111 to 3399 or 5133 to 5142 or 5413 to 5419 are included. Turning Point is the level of R&D% such that increases in R&D% have a positive effect.
For the technology and non-tech subsamples, standard errors only include White's correction for heteroskedasticity.
Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value. Only parents with NAICS industries 3111 to 3399 or 5133 to 5142 or 5413 to 5419 are included. Standard errors are in parentheses. + indicates significance at 10% level, * at 5% level, and ** at 1% level. The log likelihood function is very flat at the optimum. These results should be interpreted with caution. Regressions do not include one obvious outlier where R&D% > 1 and more than twice as large as next largest value.
